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Abstract—After the outbreak of COVID-19, the Internet of
Medical Things (IoMT) has enabled the doctors to remotely
perform their duties like diagnosing the patients, controlling the
medical equipment, and monitoring the health of the quarantined
patients in real-time through their digital devices. In IoMT, the
security has paramount importance because the nodes exchange
critical information over the vulnerable wireless medium. Attack-
ers can exploit these vulnerabilities to eavesdrop on the vaccine
formula, modify the antigen test results, switch off ventilators,
etc. which can result in irreparable losses and fatalities. The
virtual medical facilities must be protected from adversarial
threats through secure sessions to ensure continuous care of
COVID-19 affected patients. To address the security threat in
IoMT, this paper proposes a lightweight and physically secure
mutual authentication and secret key establishment protocol that
makes use of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) to enable the
network devices to verify the legitimacy of the doctor (user)
and sensor node before establishing a session key. PUF also
protects the sensor nodes deployed in an unattended and hostile
environment from tampering, cloning, and side-channel attacks.
The proposed protocol exhibits all the necessary security proper-
ties required to protect the IoMT networks like authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, untraceability, and so on.
The formal (AVISPA) and informal security analysis demonstrate
its robustness against attacks like impersonation, replay, a man
in the middle, etc.
Index Terms—Internet of Medical Things, Cyber-physical Sys-
tem, COVID-19, Security, Key management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in December 2019 the
healthcare professionals around the word giving serious efforts
and putting their lives at stake to cure the patients suffering
from COVID-2019. To enable the doctors to perform their
duties safely, the hospital authorities are trying to transform
their physical medical practices to telemedical practices. Inter-
net of Medical Things (IoMT) has evolved from the Internet of
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Things (IoT), where the doctor can use the wireless media to
communicate with IoT enabled sensor nodes such as smart
thermometers, smart ventilators, and so on [1]. The IoT
enabled sensor nodes collect, analyze, and disseminate the
health reports of the patients in real-time to the doctors [2]
and enable them to diagnose, treat, and monitor the COVID-
19 infected patients remotely. There are many challenges in
the implementation and utilization of IoMT networks. The
substantial issue lies with the several adversarial threats,
security and privacy of the sensitive information of patients
and healthcare institutions. The possible adversarial threats
are eavesdropping [3], data breach [4], and denial of service
(DoS) [5]. The situation becomes more adverse in IoMT since
medical users and vendors have limited awareness of security
threats [6] and possible remedies [7]. As per the reports,
the adversary prefers to breach the data that mainly includes
patients names, bank details, medical history, and insurance
information, etc.
The attackers are gaining more interest in IoMT due to the
exponential growth of its market [8]. The adversaries exploits
the vulnerabilities of the systems and networks to conduct
cyber attacks and achieve their malicious desires. The absence
of robust mutual authentication and key establishment scheme
is the key factor attracting the adversaries towards IoMT
networks [9]. The existing mutual authentication schemes
are not directly applicable to IoMT networks as they are
computation and communication expensive and can drain the
precious energy reserves of IoT sensor nodes [10]. Moreover,
most of the schemes do not consider the hostile environment of
deployment of sensor nodes and become vulnerable to phys-
ical, cloning, and side-channel attacks [11]. Therefore, IoMT
networks need a practical mutual authentication and secret
key establishment approach that can provide robust security
in all environments while being lightweight in computation
and communication.
II. RELATED WORK
Wolf et al. [12] emphasized on the various security is-
sues in the Cyber-Physical systems and proposed a dynamic
password-based user authentication model to restrict the unau-
thorized access to wireless sensor networks. Yeh et al. [13]
introduced an asymmetric cryptography based authentication
protocol for resource constrained networks but the scheme did
not accomplish mutual authentication and is computationally
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expensive due to the use of public key cryptography. Khalil et
al. [14] analysed that few user authentication and key agree-
ment schemes for IoT environment are subjected to physical,
man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. Wu et al. [15] revealed
that a dynamic identity oriented user authentication protocol
developed by Hsieh and Leu [16] has taken inadequate security
measures to protect the session key, and is prone to physical
attacks on sensor nodes. [17] introduced a novel lightweight
approach to securing the IoT node communications with the
cloud, however, the scheme is vulnerable to MITM, replay,
and impersonation attacks. Li et al. [18] designed a 3-
factor user authentication scheme acquiring inputs such as
user identity, password, and biometrics for its operation. As
aforementioned, it is resource expensive since it computes 3
factors and exchanges 2688 bits. To reduce the computation
expenditure, Esfahani et al. [19] introduced a lightweight
scheme that makes use of only one way hash function and bit-
wise XOR operations. But the security analysis is inadequate
to declare the protocol as robust against attacks. A hybrid
model of authentication and key establishment is proposed in
[20]. Paliwal [21] proposed a mutual authentication and key
agreement approach with the use of lightweight one-way cryp-
tography hash operations. The scheme protects the anonymity
of identities but encounters difficulties in preserving privacy.
In summary, most of the protocols are insecure against
significant adversarial threats, fail to exhibit essential secu-
rity properties to keep the communication secure, and are
computationally and communication expensive. The IoMT
networks carry very critical information, wherein a mild attack
can result in fatalities. Therefore, the IoMT networks must
deploy a strong mutual authentication and physically protected
lightweight key establishment protocol to enable only the
legitimate devices to communicate using a secured session key.
A. Contribution
Considering the importance of security and privacy of
the communications in IoMT networks, this article pro-
poses a lightweight, robust, and physically secure Mutual
Authentication and Secret Key (MASK) establishment proto-
col for securing the sensitive health information of the patients.
The protocol only permits the legitimate users to establish a
secure connection with the IoT enabled medical equipment’s
(sensor nodes) for fetching the health reports of the patients.
The protocol uses lightweight cryptography primitives, such as
one-way hash function, nonce, and bit-wise XOR operations.
The protocol exhibits all essential security properties like
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, etc. Relia-
bility of the proposed protocol under compromised conditions
is verified using formal and informal security analysis.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A smart healthcare facility where COVID-19 affected pa-
tients take care constitutes of sensor nodes, gateway, and
the user (e.g., doctor). The sensor nodes are integrated with
the medical equipment to monitor the patients’ health, etc.
Gateway is used to relay the information between doctor and
IoT enabled sensor nodes whereas the user (e.g., doctor) is
Table I
SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND OPERATORS DESCRIPTION
Notation Definition
CNE C: Challenge, N : Number, E: Entity
RNE R: Response, N : Number, E: Entity
PD , PSN Physically Unclonable Function
DHID Unique identity of doctor issued by Hospital
DMCCLN Unique license no. issued by Medical Council
SNIEI International equipment identity of Sensor Node
TIDU , TIDSN Temporary identity of User and Sensor Node
PWU User password
NU , NG, NSN Nonce
SKU , SKSN Session Key
F Strong cryptography function
h(.) one way cryptography hash function
⊕, ‖ Bit-wise XOR and concatenation operator
A ≡? B Is A identical to B?
interested to receive real time information from sensor nodes
to take decisive actions regarding the patients’ treatment.
A. Security and other goals
MASK protocol attains all the prominent security proper-
ties [10].The proposed protocol also introduces a mechanism
to protect the devices from physical tampering resulting in pre-
vention from aforesaid attacks. MASK protocol also complies
with the essential property to claim the protocol as efficient.
The proposed protocol use lightweight cryptography opera-
tions and minimum message exchanges while still providing
the highest level of security.
B. Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) are recommended
as a solution to secure the hardware from adversarial threats.
PUF is primarily endorsed for authenticating the edge devices
having limited computing power, small memory, and so forth.
Since the IoT devices transmit crucial data, therefore it be-
comes a necessity to integrate strong authentication algorithms
to protect the devices from unauthorised abuses. However,
being resource constrained, it becomes difficult for the edge
devices to execute algorithms with acute requirements. As a
result, the authentication of resource constrained edge (IoT)
devices becomes a challenge.
IV. PROPOSED SECURITY FRAMEWORK
To prevent the IoMT networks from adversarial threats,
the proposed protocol empowers the devices to perform mu-
tual authentication followed by secret key establishment. The
proposed protocol is executed in three phases, namely, user
registration, device registration, and mutual authentication and
secret key establishment. Table 1 provides the notations that
have been used throughout the paper. Prior to the discussion
on the three phases, assumptions are stated.






































































































































Figure 1. User Registration Phase.
A. User Registration Phase
The user(‘doctor’) has to register its trusted device in
the gateway for obtaining real time health information of
the patients. The whole registration process is demonstrated
through fig. 1 as follows.
Step 1: Initially, the gateway generates a random challenge
C0U for the current registration process along with another set
of challenges CSY NU = {C1U , C2U , ..., CNU }. CSY NU consists of
many random challenges that will be used by the gateway
in future to verify the user device. The gateway forms the
message {C0U , CSY NU } and sends it to doctor’s device.
Step 2: Upon receiving the message, {C0U , CSY NU }, doc-
tor’s device triggers the PUF to generate the response, R0U (=
PD(C
0






U comprises of re-
sponses to many random challenges (= R1U , R
2
U , ..., R
N
U ) that
will be used by the gateway to authenticate the doctor’s device
in future correspondences. Post response generation by PUF,
doctor inputs his/her unique identity details, DHID, and D
MCC
LN .
Thereafter, doctor’s device compute α = h(C0U‖CSY NU ) to
enable the gateway to verify the association between received
responses (R0U , R
SY N










U , α and sends it to gateway for requesting
authorization to communicate with sensor nodes.
Step 3: After obtaining the response from user, gateway
computes β = h(C0U‖CSY NU ) and verify the identicalness
between β and α; the gateway terminates the session if result is







At the end of the registration, gateway stores the C0U , R
0
U ,








LN for future communica-
tion with user.
Step 4: Likewise, doctors’s device also computes and






LN ). Apart from TID
0
U ,
doctors’ device also computes and stores user verification code
λ, which is a function of user password (PWU ) and temporary
identity of user (TID0U ). The user will be prompted to enter
the password (PWU ) every time he/she wishes to access the
device for the particular application.
Remark 1: It is worth noting that TID0U is a function
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Compute:δ = h (C0SN||C
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Verify: η      δ, if not, abort
















Figure 2. Sensor Node Registration Phase.
every session, thus achieving untraceability. Moreover, instead
of real identity of user {DHID, DMCCLN }, temporary identity
TID0U is used to preserve user anonymity during message
exchanges. Being resource constrained, the user device only
executes few lightweight cryptography operations (hash and
PUF) during registration to preserve resources. As no secret
credentials are stored in the user device, therefore it cannot
reveal any sensitive information (e.g., PWU ) despite being
attacked. Besides, the protocol prevents the unauthorized ac-
cess to the device by enabling the user authentication code, λ.
The authentication code λ is a function of TID0U and updates
every session to protect the device from adversarial threats.
B. Device Registration Phase
The IoT enabled sensor node(‘sensor node’) integrated with
the medical equipment at the healthcare institution is first
registered with the gateway. The registration process is very
essential to discriminate between legitimate and malicious
nodes. The gateway does not permit the doctor to communicate
with the non-registered nodes to prevent cyber attacks. The
whole process of sensor node registration is depicted in fig. 2
and discussed as follows.
Step 1: The gateway initially generates a challenge for
sensor node registration C0SN followed by another set of chal-
lenges CSY NSN {C1SN , C2SN , ..., CNSN} to be used by gateway
for future verification of the sensor node. The composed
message {C0SN , CSY NSN } is then sent to the sensor node
through a secure channel.
Step 2: Once the sensor node receives the message {C0SN ,
CSY NSN }, it begins deriving the responses to the received
challenges (C0SN , C
SY N
SN ). The sensor node gives the challenge
C0SN , C
SY N
SN as an input to the PUF wherein PUF generates




SN = PSN (C
SY N
SN )
to the challenges. The sensor node computes δ = h(C0SN ‖
CSY NSN ) to empower the gateway in verifying the association
between response and challenges. Finally, the sensor node
prepares a message {SNIEI , R0SN , RSY NSN , δ} and delivers it
to the gateway through a secure channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the message, gateway at first
computes η = h(C0SN ‖ CSY NSN ) followed by a comparison
of η ≡? δ to verify the relationship between responses and
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challenges. Subsequently, the gateway derives the temporary
identity of the sensor node TID0SN {= F (C0SN , SNIEI)}.
After the computations and retrieval, the gateway stores the






SN , and TID
0
SN for future
interaction with the sensor node.
Step 4: Likewise, the sensor node computes and stores the
temporary identity TID0SN {= F (C0SN , SNIEI)}. The use
of temporary identity enables the sensor node to accomplish
anonymity and untraceability while exchanging messages over
the public channel.
Remark 2: Gateway records the real identity of the sensor
node SNIEI during registration for future correspondence
purposes. Being resource-constrained and deployed in a hostile
environment, the protocol does not store any secret credentials
in the sensor node. Therefore, the attacker would not get any
information despite physically capturing the sensor node. Be-
sides, the sensor node only executes lightweight cryptography
operations (hash and PUF) to prolong their active lifetime.
It is noteworthy that TID0SN is a function of C
0
SN , and
SNIEI . The use of new challenge CNU for every session
assures distinct short-term identity of sensor node TIDNSN for
every session, therefore accomplishing untraceability. More-
over, TID0SN does not disclose the real identity of the sensor
node during message exchanges, thus preserving sensor node
identity anonymity.
C. Mutual Authentication and Secret Key Establishment Phase
This phase demonstrates how the proposed protocol ensures
the security and privacy of real-time communication between
a doctor and a sensor node. The doctor and the sensor node
prove their legitimacy to gateway succeeded by secret key es-
tablishment to prevent the unauthorized access of information
to illegitimate nodes. The total process is illustrated in fig. 3
and explained as follows:
Step 1: Initially the doctor has to prove its identity to the
device. At this stage, the doctor has to input the same password
PWU that was kept by him/her during the registration process.
After the doctor enters the password PWU , the doctor’s
device calculates λ∗ = h(PWU‖TID0U ) and verify the user
authenticity, λ∗ ≡? λ. In case of non-equivalency, the device
does not permit the user to succeed in further communication,
whereas successful verification indicates that the device is
being used by the legitimate user and should be permitted to
proceed further. Afterward, the device generates a nonce N1U ,
and compute N1∗U = N
1
U ⊕ DHID to protect the nonce privacy.
The doctor’s device creates a pseudo-identity TID0∗U = TID
0
U
⊕ DMCCLN from the temporary identity TID0U to add a second
layer of identity anonymity and untraceability protection. At
last, the doctor’s device prepares the message {N1∗U , TID0∗U }
and sends it to the gateway through a public channel.
Step 2: After receiving the identity details of user {N1∗U ,
TID0∗U }, the gateway extracts the real nonce, N1U = N1∗U ⊕
DHID. Thereupon, the gateway verifies the freshness of the
N1U . Subsequently, the gateway derives the temporary identity
from pseudo-identity, TID0U = TID
0∗
U ⊕ DMCCLN and matches
with the database. Non-availability of TID0U in the database
indicates a fraudulent attempt by an adversarial node. Once
TID0U is located in the database, the gateway selects the
corresponding challenge (C0U ) and response (R
0
U ). To meet
the privacy requirements, the gateway encloses the real C0U ,
N1G within the G1 (= D
H
ID⊕C0U ) and G2 (= DMCCLN ⊕N1G).
As the identity details of doctor DHID, D
MCC
LN are not disclosed
to anyone, therefore no one else can extract C0U and N
1
G other
than gateway; the doctor identity details are already provided
to the gateway during registration. Finally, the gateway com-
putes G3 = h(C0U‖N1G‖R0U ); G3 can help the doctor’s device
to verify the authenticity of the gateway. The gateway sends
the challenge C0U , nonce N
1
G, and authentication message
enclosed in G1, G2, and G3, respectively to the doctor’s device
through a public channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the G1, G2, and G3 from the
gateway, the doctor’s device begins extracting the challenge
C0∗U = G1 ⊕ DHID, and nonce N1∗G = G2 ⊕ DMCCLN .
After examining the freshness of N1∗G , doctor’s device ex-
tracts response from PUF, R0∗U = PD(C
0∗
U ). Subsequently,
the doctor’s device calculates U1 = h(C0∗U ‖N1∗G ‖R0∗U ) and
compares with G3 {= h(C0U‖N1G‖R0U )}. The equal values
hereby proves the authenticity of the gateway as only gateway
has the knowledge of R0U , whereas unequal values indicates
a suspicious attempt by an unauthorized entity. The user
device then prepares the pseudo-identity of the sensor node
SN∗IEI = h(D
H
ID‖DMCCLN ‖R0∗U ‖N1∗G ) ⊕ SNIEI with whom
the communication link has to be established. Thereafter,
the doctor device prepares device authentication value, U2 =
h(C0∗U ‖N1∗G ‖R0∗U ‖TID0U ). Likewise, other nonces used in the
protocol, N2U is also shared secretly with gateway. The final
message {U2, U3, SN∗IEI} is then sent to the gateway through
a public channel.
Step 4: Firstly, the gateway derives the N2U = U3 ⊕
DMCCLN and evaluates the freshness. If fresh, gateway begins
the computation of G4 = h(C0U‖N1G‖R0U‖TID0U and examines
the identicalness between U2 and G4. The message cannot
be duplicated as it contains N2U , moreover, it cannot be
prepared by anonymous entity since it contains TID0U which
is only available with doctor’s device and gateway. The mutual
authentication between doctor and gateway gets accomplished
if U2 ≡ G4, else fails. The gateway afterward extract the
real identity of the sensor node for accomplishing mutual
authentication, SNIEI = SN∗IEI⊕h(DHID‖DMCCLN ‖R0U‖N1G).
After retrieving SNIEI , the gateway then selects the cor-
responding C0SN , R
0
SN pair and generates the N
2
G. To en-
sure privacy, the challenge C0SN and the nonce N
2
G is se-
cretly enclosed within G5 and G6, respectively. Gateway
also prepares G7 = h(C0SN‖N2G‖R0SN ) to prove its identity
to the sensor node. The gateway calculates the session key
(SK) for the sensor node and enclose it secretly within
SK∗SN (= h(R
0
SN‖TID0SN ) ⊕ SK). Correspondingly, gate-
way also encloses the temporary identity of doctor within
µ (= h(R0SN‖SK‖N2G) ⊕ TID0U ). Lastly, gateway selects
a random new challenge C1SN from the set of challenges
CSY NSN generated at the time of registration and computes
C1∗SN = h(C
0
SN‖R0SN ) ⊕ C1SN . The gateway compose a
message consisting of G5, G6, G7, SK∗SN , µ, C
1∗
SN and send
it to the sensor node through a public channel.
Step 5: After receiving the message {G5, G6, G7,
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DOCTOR GATEWAY SENSOR NODE
Input: PWU
Compute: λ* h= (PWU || TID
0
U)
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Figure 3. A lightweight and physically protected mutual authentication and secret key establishment protocol for real time data access in IoMT networks
SK∗SN , µ, C
1∗
SN} from gateway, the sensor node retrieves
C0∗SN = G5⊕SNIEI . Subsequently, the sensor node calculates
N2∗G = G6 ⊕ TID0SN and examines the freshness of N2∗G .
Thereafter, the sensor node extracts the response from the
PUF, R0∗SN = PSN (C
0∗
SN ). The sensor node derives SN1 =
h(C0∗SN‖N2∗G ‖R0∗SN ) and compares G7 ≡? SN1; dissimilar
values here indicate the failure of gateway authentication. If
authentication is successful, the sensor node determines its
session key by calculating SK = h(R0∗SN‖TID0∗SN )⊕SK∗SN .
Likewise, sensor node extracts the temporary identity of doc-
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tor, TID0U = h(R
0∗
SN‖SK‖N2∗G ) ⊕ µ. Afterward, the sensor
node generates the nonce N1SN and enclose it within SN2
(= N1SN ⊕ TID0SN ) for its safe transmission. Besides, the
sensor node computes SN3 = h(C0∗SN‖N2∗G ‖R0∗SN‖SK) to
accomplish mutual authentication with gateway and also to
assure the gateway of correct session key (SK) generation.
Following the SN3, the sensor node retrieves the new chal-
lenge C1SN = h(C
0∗
SN‖R0∗SN )⊕C1∗SN provided by the gateway
to generate new temporary identity TID1SN required for next
future session. Once new challenge C1SN is extracted, the
sensor node calculates the TID1SN = F (C
1
SN , SNIEI) and
stores the new temporary identity for future communication
with gateway. At last, the sensor node composes a message
{SN2, SN3} and send it to gateway through a public channel.
Step 6: Upon receiving SN2 and SN3, the gateway
starts the retrieval of N1SN (= SN2 ⊕ TID0SN ) and ver-
ifies the freshness of N1SN . After the nonce verification,
the gateway computes, G8 = h(C0SN‖N2G‖R0SN‖SK) and
compares, SN3 ≡? G8. Identical terms here indicate the
successful mutual authentication along with an assurance of
correct key generation by sensor node. Succeeding verifi-
cation, the gateway calculates G9 = N3G ⊕ DHID. There-
after, gateway encloses the session key of the user within
SK∗U = h(N
3
G‖TID0U ) ⊕ SK. Subsequently, the gateway
calculates G10 = h(TID0U‖DHID‖DMCCLN ‖SK) to let the
user node verify the correct key generation. Post G10 com-
putation, the gateway selects a random new challenge C1U
from the list of challenges CSY NU constructed during reg-
istration. Hence, the gateway encloses the new challenge
within C1∗U (= h(C
0
U‖R0U ) ⊕ C1U ) to ensure confidentiality.
Finally, the gateway calculates the new temporary identity






LN ) and sensor node,
TID1SN = F (C
1
SN , SNIEI). The gateway then stores the






SN into the database for future com-
munication with the user and sensor node. The gateway
compose a message {G9, SK∗U , G10, C1∗U } and sends it to
doctor’s device through a public channel.
Step 7: The doctor’s device receives the message
{G9, SK∗U , G10, C1∗U } from gateway. The doctor’s device re-
trieves the nonce N3G = G9⊕DHID and examines its freshness.
Thereafter, the doctor’s device begins the extraction of session
key, SK = h(N3G‖TID0U ) ⊕ SK∗U . Upon successful extrac-
tion, the device computes U4 = h(TID0U‖DHID‖DMCCLN ‖SK)
and verify the identicalness between U4 and G10. Identical
U4 and G10 results in accomplishment of mutual authentica-
tion between doctor’s device and gateway whereas dissimilar
U4 and G10 results in connection termination. Successful
verification also assures the doctor’s device of correct key
generation. Finally the device extracts the new challenge C1U =
h(C0∗U ‖R0∗U )⊕C1∗U and computes the new temporary identity,






LN ). The doctor’s device stores
the new temporary identity TID1U for future communication
with the gateway.
Remark 3: The user authentication on the device ensures
that only legitimate user is allowed to access the device
for obtaining information from sensor nodes. Likewise user’s
device, the gateway also verifies the TIDU and TIDSN and
permits only legitimate devices to access sensor nodes. In the
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Figure 4. Results obtained from AVISPA while using OFMC and CL-AtSe
backend.
proposed protocol, real identities of sensor node SNIEI and
doctor DHID, D
MCC
LN are not used, instead temporary identities
TID0U and TID
0
SN are used to accomplish identity anonymity
and untraceability. Also, nonces are used in all messages
to ensure freshness and protection against replay attacks. It
is worth noting that neither the challenge {C0U , C0SN} nor
the nonce {N1U , N2U , N1G, N2G, N3G} are disclosed on the
public channel, therefore only authorized entities are entitled
to retrieve this information. The verification message (U2) for
gateway is sent as a message digest, thereby not allowing the
attacker to interpret and modify despite eavesdropping the G1,
G3, and TID0∗U . Moreover, the attacker cannot prepare U2
because he does not have the knowledge of the C0∗U , N
1∗
G ,
R0∗U , and TID
0
U . Similarly, attacker cannot interpret and alter
G7 despite eavesdropping G5, G6, and G7 because he does




SN . The proposed
protocol enables the gateway to exchange the session key and
user identity securely with sensor node since it is enclosed
using the values (R0SN , TID
0
SN , and N
2
G) not available to
anyone except sensor node.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of the MASK protocol has been verified
through formal and informal analysis. The inferences obtained
from the analysis are discussed as follows.
A. Formal Analysis
To examine the strength of the MASK protocol, we have
used the “Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols
and Applications (AVISPA)” tool [3], [22]. AVISPA tool is
broadly adopted by the researchers for the strength investiga-
tion of mutual authentication and secret key establishment pro-
tocols. The MASK protocol has been scripted into the AVISPA
understandable High-Level Protocol Specification Language
(HLPSL). The MASK-HLPSL file is further transformed into
Intermediate Format (IF) before being delivered to the backend
of AVISPA. For the vulnerability assessment of MASK pro-
tocol, AVISPA is configured with Dolev-Yao (DY) adversary
model [23]. The backend upon execution declares the scheme
as either “safe/unsafe,” or “inconclusive”; inconclusive mainly
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results when the simulation of the protocol fails to happen
either due to script error or backend incompatibility to a
cryptography operation.
The MASK-HLPSL script contains the description of 3
basic roles, “user,” “gateway,” and “IoT node”. Besides, the
environment role defines the various sessions and intruder
knowledge. As per the DY adversary model, the attacker has
the capability to eavesdrop, alter, and replay the information.
Another element in the environment role is “declaration of
goals”. The goals declared in the environment role of MASK
protocol are data privacy, freshness, and authentication, etc.
Upon execution, the OFMC backend produced the result as
“safe” after visiting 88 nodes with a depth of 11 plies.
Likewise, simulation of CL-AtSe took 0.19s to declare the
protocol as “safe.” The MASK-HLPSL-IF script has been fed
to other 2 backends (SATMC and TA4SP) as well, but resulted
inconclusive because these backends do not support bit-wise
XOR operations. Therefore, it can be summarized from the
results of OFMC and CL-AtSe backends that MASK protocol
is safe from all prominent attacks including, replay and MITM.
B. Informal Analysis
The strength of the MASK protocol has been analyzed
informally in this section for the following security properties
and attacks.
Theorem 1. Resistant to replay attacks.
Proof. In a replay attack, the adversary captures the message
and tries to resend it to the sensor node after a certain time
to access unauthorized medical information of patients. Let us
assume that the adversary has eavesdropped on the message
{N1∗U , T ID0∗U } sent by the doctor to the gateway. The adver-
sary later replays the message {N1∗U , T ID0∗U } to the gateway;
the gateway discards the request since it contains old nonce,
N1U . The MASK protocol equips every message with a random
integer value called a nonce to accomplish message freshness
that prevents replay attacks. Similarly, other exchanged mes-
sages {G1, G2, G3}, {U2, U3, SN∗IEI}, {G5, G6, G7, SK∗SN ,
µ, C1∗SN}, {SN2, SN3}, and {G9, SK∗U , G10, C1∗U } contains






SN , and N
3
G, respectively; thus
ensuring the overall protection of the IoMT network from
replay attacks. Moreover, the adversary cannot modify the
nonce because it is enclosed secretly within other elements
of the message. For example, the nonce sent by sensor node
towards gateway is computed as SN2 = N1SN ⊕ TID0SN ;
since the adversary does not know TID0SN , therefore attacker
can’t revive and modify the nonce, N1SN . Hence, MASK
protocol accomplishes message freshness and prevents replay
attacks.
Theorem 2. Secured from impersonation and MITM attacks.
Proof. The adversary in impersonation attack tries to pose
himself as the legitimate entity to get unauthorized access
to legitimate information. The adversary needs to have some
knowledge of the victim or its device credentials before
launching this attack. In the MASK protocol, neither the true
identities nor the secret information is shared over the public
channel. Consider a scenario where attacker intercepted the
message comprising G5, G6, G7, SK∗SN , µ, and C
1∗
SN . The
message contains the identity of user, TID0U and secret key,
SK but enclosed secretly within µ {= h(R0SN‖SK‖N2G) ⊕
TID0U} and SK∗SN {= h(R0SN‖TID0SN ) ⊕ SK}. For the
attacker, it is computationally infeasible to retrieve TID0SN
and SK from µ and SK∗SN due to collision-resistant property
of hash functions [11]. Moreover, every device employing
MASK protocol is integrated with unique PUF. The attacker
neither has any knowledge of the responses generated by the
PUF (R0U , R
0
SN ) nor can predict [24]; therefore, the attacker
cannot duplicate the identity of the user and sensor node.
Hence, the proposed protocol is protected from impersonation
attacks.
The attacker can also play MITM to compromise the
communications. Let us suppose that adversary has captured
the message {U2, U3, SN∗IEI}. Subsequently, the adversary
can try to modify the captured message to execute MITM. The
adversary becomes unsuccessful to make any modifications
in the MASK protocol messages because the information in
the messages U2 = h(C0∗U ‖N1∗G ‖R0∗U ‖TID0U ), U2 =N2U ⊕




ID‖DMCCLN ‖R0∗U ‖N1∗G ) ⊕ SNIEI
are processed through one-way hash function and bit-wise
XOR operation. The collision resistant property of hash
functions [11] does not allow the attacker to either pre-












Likewise, other messages of the MASK protocol are protected.
Therefore, the MASK protocol is secured against MITM
attacks.
Theorem 3. Preserves integrity and prevent modifications.
Proof. The alterations by the attacker can ruin the real intent
of the message and may produce unexpected outcomes. Con-
sider an instance where adversary captured the message U2
{= h(C0∗U ‖N1∗G ‖R0∗U ‖TID0U )}, U3 {=N2U ⊕DMCCLN }, SN∗IEI
{=h(DHID‖DMCCLN ‖R0∗U ‖N1∗G ) ⊕ SNIEI}. Despite capturing,
the adversary cannot modify it since it is available as a
message digest and can’t be revived. The adversary has no
information related to PUF (R0∗U ), nonce (N
2
U ), and identity
(DHID), etc. required to modify the data. Moreover, the in-
formation computed through one way hash function complies
with collision-resistant property [11] that does not allow the
attacker to generate information from the message digest. The
other messages of the MASK protocol are also composed
similarly. Thus, the MASK protocol preserves the message
integrity and further safeguard from modification attacks.
Theorem 4. Defence against DoS attacks.
Proof. The adversary can try to disrupt the services of legit-
imate entities by flooding them with fraudulent requests. The
consequences can be mild to severe including, exhaustion of
battery reserves, temporary shutdown of network, denial of
service to legitimate entities due to request overloading, etc.
[25], [26]. Let us assume that the adversary eavesdropped on
the message G1 (= DHID ⊕ C0U ) , G2 (= DMCCLN ⊕ N1G),
G3 (= h(C
0
U‖N1G‖R0U )), and replayed it later to exhaust
the battery reserves of the user device. Immediately after
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reception, the user device verifies the nonce N1G, since the
replayed message contains the old nonce, the user device
terminates the connection instead of allocating new resources.
Therefore, the MASK protocol can protect the network from
DoS attacks to some extent.
Theorem 5. Promises session key security and protection from
known key attacks.
Proof. The adversary desires to acquire the session key to
compromise all the future communications. In the MASK pro-
tocol, the gateway exchanges the secret key with sensor node
and user device through the following messages, {G5, G6, G7,
SK∗SN , µ, C
1∗
SN}, {G9, SK∗U , G10, C1∗U }, respectively. It is
noteworthy that session key of sensor node is secretly enclosed
within the SK∗SN (= h(R
0
SN‖TID0SN )⊕SK). Similarly, the
session key for the user is also encapsulated secretly within
SK∗U = h(N
3
G‖TID0U )⊕ SK. Therefore, the adversary who




G cannot revive the
session key (SK). Let us take a hypothetical case that adver-
sary somehow has obtained the information after the expiry
of the session, e.g., response (R0U , R
0
SN ), temporary identity
(TID0U , T ID
0
SN ), and session key (SK). These details would
not help the adversary to request new keys from the gateway





TID1SN which is required for authentication at gateway before
establishment of new session keys. Therefore, knowing an old
key does not enable the attacker to predict or compute new
session keys. Therefore, the MASK protocol attains session
key security and prevents known key attacks.
Theorem 6. Protection against physical attacks.
Proof. Due to the tiny size, the sensor nodes deployed in a
hostile environment is always subjected to physical attacks.
Assume a situation where the attacker has physically captured
the sensor node. The attacker’s aim is either to prepare a
clone or steal information from the chip of the sensor node.
As aforementioned in the protocol description, the MASK
protocol integrates the user device and sensor node with the
PUF to protect them from physical tampering. Since the output
of the PUF {R0U = PD(C0U ), R0SN = PSN (C0SN )} depends
upon the intrinsic physical variations in the IC, therefore any
attempt to tamper with the PUF would destroy the unique
characteristics of the device and render the PUF useless
[11]. Additionally, MASK protocol does not store any crucial
information in the sensor node and user device. Consequently,
the MASK protocol is safe against cloning and side-channel
attacks.
Theorem 7. Exhibits data privacy.
Proof. The adversaries captures the information and misuse it
for their own benefit. It can be seen that MASK protocol does
not exchange anything in the plain text considering the vul-
nerability of the wireless channel. Assume an instance where
the adversary has captured the message G9, SK∗U , G10, C
1∗
U to
extract the useful information. The message component G9 is
composed of nonce (N3G) and doctor identity (D
H
ID); the at-
tacker would not be able to retrieve the real nonce (N3G) as the
doctor identity (DHID) is never disclosed openly. Similarly G10
= h(TID0U‖DHID‖DMCCLN ‖SK), SK∗U = h(N3G‖TID0U ) ⊕
SK, and C1∗U (= h(C
0
U‖R0U )⊕C1U ) are computed using secret
values and one way hash function. Therefore, the information
in the message remains confidential. Likewise, the remaining
messages of the protocol preserves the data privacy.
Theorem 8. Attainment of user and sensor node identity
anonymity and untraceability.
Proof. The attackers use the identity information to con-
duct impersonation and MITM attacks whereas trace the
origin of messages to perform physical and DoS attacks.
Let us imagine that adversary has captured the message
{N1∗U , T ID0∗U } to extract the identity details (DHID, DMCCLN )
of user. In spite of successful capturing, the adversary can
not reveal the real identity (DHID, D
MCC
LN ) since it is never
used during mutual authentication and key agreement phase.
During the registration phase of MASK protocol, the gateway
generates the temporary identity of the sensor node TID0SN
and user device TID0U for future correspondence. Moreover,
the temporary identity is further transformed into pseudo-
identity during the mutual authentication for enhanced se-
curity. The user device sends the pseudo-identity of sensor
node SN∗IEI = h(D
H
ID‖DMCCLN ‖R0∗U ‖N1∗G ) ⊕ SNIEI and
itself TID0∗U = TID
0
U ⊕ DMCCLN while communicating with
the gateway. Hence the real identities of the sensor node
and user device are never disclosed, thus keeping the com-
munication anonymous. Moreover, the temporary identities








SN = F (C
0
SN , SNIEI)
changes every session due to change in input challenge
(C1U , C
2






SN , .., C
N
SN ), thus ensuring untrace-
ability of user device and sensor node.
VI. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The MASK protocol has been tested considering CM5000
TelosB mote with specifications as TI MSP430F1611 micro-
controller, CC2420 RF chip, memory 1 MB, and a power
source of 3V (2×AA battery) [29]. The CM5000 TelosB mote
is effective in operation but suffers due to limited resources
such as power capacity, computing capability, storage space,
and so on. Therefore, the security protocols should operate
with minimum storage requirements. Besides, the security
protocols should consume minimum energy while computation
and communication to extend the lifetime of devices and hence
networks. Considering the requirements, the MASK protocol
has been evaluated in the resource-constrained environment to
verify its suitability for the lightweight applications of IoMT.
During the investigation, it is revealed that MASK protocol
makes use of only 0.0008% of total memory space available
in CM5000 TelosB mote whereas the schemes [10], [19],
[21] requires 0.036%, 0.027%, and 0.015% of the storage
space, respectively. It is evident from the investigation that
the MASK protocol has very little storage space requirements
in comparison to conventional protocols [10], [19], [21]. It is
worth noting that the remaining schemes [18], [20], [22], [28]
have not mentioned the storage cost requirements, hence the
comparison is not possible.
The strength of the MASK protocol in a compromised
environment has been examined and the results are presented
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Table II
COMPARISON OF MASK PROTOCOL VS. CONVENTIONAL PROTOCOLS
ON THE BASIS OF PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACKS AND
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
SG [10] [27] [28] [22] [18] [19] [20] [21] M
P1 X X X X X X X X X
P2 X X X X X X X X X
P3 X X X X X X X X X
P4 X × × X × × × X X
P5 X X × X × X × X X
P6 X X X × × X X X X
P7 × X × × × × × × X
P8 × X × × × × × × X
P9 X X X X X X X X X
P10 X × × X × × × × X
P11 X X X X × × X X X
P12 X X X X X X X X X
P13 X X X X X X × X X
P14 ∗ X X X X ∗ X X X
P15 X X × × × X × × X
P16 ∗ X × X X ∗ X X X
P17 × X × × × × × × X
Acronyms: SG : Security goals, M: MASK protocol, X: Secure against
attack/preserves a security attribute, ×: Vulnerable/non accomplishment
of security attribute, ∗: Not applicable, P1: Replay, P2: Impersonation,
P3: Modification of messages, P4: DoS, P5: MITM, P6: Known key,
P7: Cloning, P8: Side-channel, P9: Mutual authentication, P10: Data
privacy, P11: Session key security, P12: Message integrity, P13: Message
freshness, P14: User identity anonymity, P15: Sensor node identity
anonymity, P16: User untraceability, P17: Sensor node untraceability
in Table II. Table II lists the various security properties that are
preserved by the protocol during its execution accompanied
by the type of attacks that MASK protocol can withstand.
The MASK protocol ensures data privacy, identity anonymity,
untraceability, integrity, freshness, and session key security.
Apart from the accomplishment of security properties, the
MASK protocol is guarded against the most prominent attacks,
to name a few, impersonation, modification, MITM, replay,
cloning, and side-channel attacks. On the contrary, the con-
ventional approaches [10], [18]–[22], [28] do not guarantee
data privacy and untraceability. Moreover, these schemes [10],
[18]–[22], [28] are also vulnerable to side-channel and cloning
attacks. Also, the scheme proposed by Gope et al. [27] does
not protect against DoS attacks. Since most of the schemes are
neither protecting against physical attacks nor accomplishing
untraceability and anonymity, therefore their deployment in a
hostile environment can pose threats to the entire network.
Hence, the MASK protocol is superior in contrast to other
schemes [10], [18]–[22], [27], [28] in terms of preserving
security properties and protection from attacks.
The protocol messages should be as minimum and as
little as possible to avoid draining the battery reserves of
mote. The TelosB mote [29] consumes 0.72 µJ and 0.81
µJ of energy [3], [9], [10] while transmitting and receiving,
respectively. Table III provides the number of bits (TX /RX )
and the quantity of energy consumption (µJ) by a sensor node
during the mutual authentication and key establishment phase
of the proposed protocol. Note that the registration phase is
Table III
COMMUNICATION COST OF SENSOR NODE
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Figure 5. Energy Cost Comparison
excluded since it executes only once during network set-up.
It is apparent from the table III that MASK protocol uses the
resources of the resource-deprived sensor node efficiently in
comparison to the traditional approaches [18]–[21], [27], [28].
The schemes [10], [22] though consumes a little less energy
than the proposed protocol, however, are incompetent to pro-
vide security to real-time IoMT applications. Moreover, these
schemes [10], [22] neither prevent physical attacks nor ensure
untraceability. Hence, using these approaches [10], [18]–[22],
[27], [28] in IoMT networks can result in unexpected adverse
consequences. Fig. 5 depicts the amount of energy spent by a
sensor node for transmission and reception during the mutual
authentication and key establishment phase. It is noticeable
that the sensor node in the MASK protocol consumes the
least energy during transmission and reasonable energy while
reception. Thus, the energy-efficient characteristics of the
MASK protocol makes it superior in comparison to other
existing protocols [10], [18]–[22], [27], [28].
The computation cost spent by the user, gateway, and
sensor node for implementing the MASK protocol have been
analyzed and presented in Table IV. It can be observed that the
MASK protocol is computation efficient because it employs
only lightweight operations such as hash, PUF, and XOR
rather than bulky cryptography operations like asymmetric and
symmetric ciphers, scalar multiplications, and fuzzy extractors.
Table V provides the comparison of computation cost spent
by the MASK and other conventional protocols during the
mutual authentication and key agreement phase. The scheme
proposed by Gope et al. in [27] executes the PUF 5 times
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Table IV
COMPUTATION COST OF MASK PROTOCOL
Phase User Device Gateway Sensor Node Total Cost
Registration 2 CH + 2 CPUF 2 CH CH + 2 CPUF 5 CH + 4 CPUF
Key Establishment 7 CH + CPUF + 9 CXOR 11 CH + 15 CXOR 5 CH + CPUF + 6 CXOR 23 CH + 2 CPUF + 15 CXOR
Total Cost 9 CH + 3 CPUF + 9 CXOR 13 CH + 15 CXOR 6 CH + 3 CPUF + 6 CXOR 28 CH + 6 CPUF + 15 CXOR
Acronyms: C - Computation, CH - Computation of Hash, CPUF - Computation of Physically Unclonable Function, CXOR - Computation of Bit-wise
XOR, Integers - defines the frequency of operation.
Table V
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON OF MASK PROTOCOL VS.
CONVENTIONAL PROTOCOLS
Scheme Computation Cost
[10] CAE + 3 CAD + 2 CH + 2 CM + 2 CXOR
[27] 22 CH + 5 CPUF + 16 CXOR + 3 CR + CB
[28] 18 CH + 9 CXOR + 2 CR
[22] 37 CH + 16 CXOR + 2 CR + CB
[18]
4 CSE + 4 CSD + 19 CH + 14 CXOR + 4 CR + CB
+ 3 CSM
[19] 15 CH + 10 CXOR + 2 CR
[20] 18 CH + 9 CXOR + 3 CR + CB + 6 CSM
[21] 25 CH + 20 CXOR + 3 CR + 9 CMOD
MASK 23 CH + 2 CPUF + 15 CXOR + 6 CR
Acronyms: C - Computation, CAE - Computation of asymmetric encryp-
tion, CAD - Computation of asymmetric decryption, CH - Computation of
Hash, CSE - Computation of symmetric encryption, CSD - Computation
of symmetric decryption, CM - Computation of hash based MAC, CR
- Computation of random number, CPUF - Computation of Physically
Unclonable Function, CB - Computation of bio-metric, CMOD - Com-
putation of modulus, CXOR - Computation of Bit-wise XOR, CSM -
Computation of Scalar Multiplication, Integers - defines the frequency of
operation.
whereas the MASK protocol only does it twice. Moreover,
the scheme in [27] uses the fuzzy extractor for retrieving the
bio-metrics whereas the MASK protocol does not use any
bio-metrics. The approaches developed by Gaba et al. [10]
and Li et al. [18] utilizes asymmetric and symmetric ciphers
that overburdens the tiny processor of the sensor node. The
other protocols designed by Das et al. [22], Li et al. [20], and
Paliwal [21] are also computing expensive since they calculate
bio-metrics, scalar multiplications, and modulus, respectively.
Besides, the approaches in [22] and [21] also make excessive
use of hash and XOR operations. The remaining protocols
[19], [28] have reasonable computation complexity, however, it
is achieved at the cost of compromised security. The schemes
in [28] and [19] are vulnerable to DoS, cloning, and side-
channel attacks and also fail to provide data privacy and sensor
node untraceability. Additionally, these approaches [19], [28]
are communication expensive as well. Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8
independently compares the cost of user, gateway, and sensor
node, of MASK and other protocols, respectively. Based on
the above analysis, it has become evident that the MASK
protocol has attained all essential security properties with a
very reasonable communication and computation cost.
The vertical bars in the Fig. 9 illustrates the total number
of messages exchanged by the sensor node throughout the













































































Figure 8. Sensor Node Computation Cost of MASK protocol vs. Conventional
Protocols
ber of messages exchanged by the sensor node during mutual
authentication and secret key establishment phase. It can be
noticed that the resource constrained sensor node employing
MASK protocol exchanges an equal number of messages as in
other protocols, hence compute inexpensive. The sensor nodes
in the schemes [28] and [22] exchange 3 and 4 messages,
respectively, which is more than the MASK protocol. The
number of message exchanges is also a performance metric





















































































[19] [20] [21] [MASK]
Figure 9. Communication Cost Comparison
to select a protocol for a particular application because more
messages lead to more delay, overhead, and energy exhaustion.
Conclusively, it can be summarized that MASK protocol is
more robust and lightweight in comparison to state of the art
protocols.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE
This article have introduced a robust and lightweight secu-
rity protocol to provide mutual authentication and secret key
establishment between doctor and sensor node. The strength
of the MASK protocol has been examined through formal and
informal security analysis where it is declared safe from all
the attacks mentioned in the DY adversary model. The perfor-
mance analysis has proven the capability of MASK protocol
to protect the sensor node from physical and other prominent
attacks. The comparison reveals that MASK protocol outper-
forms the other conventional protocols in terms of preventing
attacks, computation and communication efficiency, and so
forth. In the future, the MASK protocol may be extended
for those hostile environments where network devices like
gateways are also subjected to physical attacks.
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